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


10 July 1963

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Copy No. C *21-10*

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

Rumania--Bloc: Soviet bloc irritation with Rumania's independent attitude has been publicly revealed for the first time.

The East German party's official newspaper on 1 July excluded the Rumanian birthday message to Ulbricht from a listing of Soviet bloc messages published under a headline of "Greetings from Friends." Instead, Bucharest's message appeared the following day, sandwiched between an insultingly brief Chinese message and a North Vietnamese greeting, under the title "Congratulations from All the World."

[redacted]  
[redacted] the Rumanians are "sick and tired" of Soviet bloc policies which force them to remain a poor agricultural state. Similar complaints have been voiced by Rumanian diplomatic personnel in conversations with Westerners in recent weeks.

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\*Communist China - USSR: The Chinese Communist Party statement of 10 July is another bid for sympathy from the world Communist movement in the continuing contest for leadership between the two major parties.

As has happened frequently in the past, the Chinese have reversed the roles that the two parties play and in the face of the provocative Soviet attack are now posing as the innocent injured party. Their temperate reply, cast in tones of regret and sorrow, is designed to nullify the Soviet attempt to lay responsibility for the present situation on China's doorstep and in turn to pin the blame on the Soviet Union.

The statement dismisses the Soviet charges as "groundless" and accuses the Soviets of "unreasonable behavior," but relies more on a subtly phased series of rhetorical questions to make its points. By contrasting its own righteous behavior--reprinting Soviet letters and statements and allowing Soviet personnel in China to distribute them--with the Soviet failure to do the same, the Chinese attempt to present a picture of themselves as a mature and responsible party, worthy of leadership.

Feigning bewilderment that the Soviet Union should find something objectionable in the rally held for the five expelled Chinese, the Chinese innocently ask if the Soviet Union wants them declared

persona non grata in China as well as in the USSR. The statement insists that true "solidarity" between equals cannot be attained by adopting such a "dictatorial attitude."

The Chinese indicate that they intend to continue to press hard for their views in the bilateral talks in Moscow and thus have left the next move in their high-level political chess game up to the Russians.

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Yugoslavia - West Germany: (Economic negotiations between Belgrade and Bonn may soon be broken off.)

(West Germany has indicated that it will not grant indemnification for Yugoslavia's World War II losses or substantially relax restrictions on Yugoslav imports, two key concessions sought by Belgrade. West German counter offers probably are too minor to entice the Yugoslavs into an agreement.)

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(Belgrade has little to offer, in the German view. German officials indicate they are motivated primarily by a desire to follow the US lead in offering Yugoslavia an alternative to bloc adherence.)

(Bonn attaches little value to Belgrade's offer not to sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans and to cease defaming West Germany among the non-aligned states.)

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West Germany - Finland: (The West German Government is seeking to open three honorary consulates in Northern Finland.)

25X1 [ ] the main function of the proposed offices would be to offset the propaganda activities of East German and Czech trade representatives. The northern area is also the target for Soviet radio and television programs.)

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[ ] (The Finns have unofficial commercial representatives in both East and West Germany, but recognize neither government.)

(The Finnish Government may try to stall discussion of the proposal out of fear of an adverse Soviet reaction. The West German representative in Helsinki has indicated that rejection might result in closure of the Finnish commercial offices in Hamburg and Frankfurt.)

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
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

Japan: Prime Minister Ikeda is planning to reshuffle his cabinet to strengthen his position in preparation for national elections which must be held by October 1964. He may be forced to make more extensive changes than he wishes by pressure for reform of his Liberal Democratic Party and by revelation of scandals in the recent Tokyo gubernatorial election. It is unlikely that the changes will significantly affect Japanese foreign policy.

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Bolivia: (Four Bolivians are reported to be en route to Moscow to study public health administration. They have indicated that on their return to Bolivia they will organize a public health service. On 30 June another group of five Bolivians arrived in Lima from the USSR where they received training in trade union activity.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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